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Abstract 
It is generally recognised that countries wanting to join a monetary union should display the optimal 
currency area properties. One such property is the similarity of business cycles. We therefore 
undertook to analyse the synchronisation of business cycles between the EMU-12 and the eight new 
EU members from Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), for which the next step to be considered in 
the integration process is entry into the EMU. In contrast to the usually analysed GDP and industrial 
production data, we extend our analysis to the major expenditure and sectoral components of GDP and 
use several measures of synchronisation. The main findings of the paper are that Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia have achieved a high degree of synchronisation with EMU for GDP, industrial production 
and exports, but not for consumption and services. The other CEECs have achieved less or no 
synchronisation. There has been a significant increase in the synchronisation of GDP and also its 
major components in the EMU members since the start of the run-up to EMU. While this lends 
support for the existence of OCA endogeneity, it cannot be unambiguously attributed to it because 
there is also evidence of a world business cycle. Another finding is that the consumption-correlation 
puzzle remains, but its magnitude has greatly diminished in the EMU members, which is good news 
for common monetary policy. 
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BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONISATION 
 IN THE ENLARGED EU: 
CO-MOVEMENTS IN THE NEW AND OLD MEMBERS 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 200/MARCH 2004 
ZSOLT DARVAS AND GYÖRGY SZAPÁRY 
1. Introduction 
In the ten new EU members — eight of which are former socialist countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEECs) — attention is increasingly focused on the next step of the European 
integration process: entry into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The benefits and 
costs of a currency union have been extensively analysed in the literature, prompted in part by 
the discussions leading up to the creation of EMU and, more recently, by the discussion about 
the future enlargement of the eurozone.
1 The theoretical foundations of currency unions have 
been developed in the literature on optimum currency areas (OCA) pioneered by Mundell 
(1961) to which McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), Tavlas (1993), Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1996) and many other authors have subsequently contributed.
2 The OCA theory postulates 
that the benefits of a currency union depend on whether the countries contemplating the 
formation of a monetary union share certain common characteristics, called the OCA 
properties. Among these properties, the similarity of business cycles features prominently, 
because if cycles are synchronised, the cost of foregoing the possibility of using counter-
cyclical monetary policy is minimised. Therefore, when considering the appropriate timing of 
entry into the eurozone, satisfying the Maastricht criteria of nominal convergence of inflation, 
long-term interest rates, fiscal deficit, public debt and exchange rate stability within ERM II is 
only one set of factors to be taken into account. The question also has to be asked whether the 
business cycles are sufficiently synchronised so that the new members can comfortably give 
up monetary and exchange rate policy independence.  
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess the current degree of business cycle 
synchronisation in the CEECs vis-à-vis the eurozone cycle and to see how it compares to the 
current and earlier levels of synchronisation in the euro area countries; and (2) to analyse the 
evolution over time of the business cycle synchronisation in the eurozone countries and to 
see, in particular, whether it has increased since 1993-97, the run-up period to the EMU. This 
latter question is relevant because it has been argued in the literature that participation in a 
currency union may itself lead to greater synchronisation of business cycles. This is referred 
to in the literature as the endogeneity of the OCA properties. Using a panel of thirty years of 
data for twenty industrial countries, Frankel and Rose (1998) find a strong positive 
relationship between trade integration and business cycle correlation. Therefore, to the extent 
that participation in a currency union increases trade integration, membership in a currency 
union will lead to more highly correlated business cycles.  Rose (2000) finds that currency 
                                                 
1 See, in particular, Eichengreen (1992), Emerson et al. (1992), De Grauwe (2002) and HM Treasury (2003). 
Csajbók and Csermely (2002) analyse the costs and benefits of the introduction of the euro in Hungary. See also 
Szapáry (2002). 
2 See Mongelli (2002) for a comprehensive review of the OCA literature. 2 ⏐ DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
unions increase trade substantially and hence concludes that a country is more likely to satisfy 
the criteria for entry into a currency union ex post than ex ante. Krugman’s (1993) “lessons 
from Massachusetts” warns however that trade integration might lead to specialisation and 
therefore increase the likelihood of asymmetric shocks. 
Since Rose (2000), many others have investigated the impact of common currencies on trade, 
for instance, Persson (2001), Glick and Rose (2001) Rose and Wincoop (2001), Frankel and 
Rose (2002), Bun and Klaassen (2002), Kenen (2002), and Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003). 
All these studies demonstrate a positive effect of common currencies on trade, although the 
effect found is smaller then the initial findings of Rose (2000).
3 Another argument supporting 
the endogeneity of the OCA criteria as it may apply to the EMU is that the common monetary 
policy, supported by the discipline of the Stability and Growth Pact, eliminates or at least 
diminishes the asymmetricity of policy responses. If policies are the source of shocks, EMU 
membership reduces the risk of asymmetricity of shocks. 
Our research contributes to the business cycle co-movement literature in the following ways. 
First, we look at a large number of countries: eight CEECs, ten eurozone countries and a 
control group consisting of the three EMU-outs and five other countries to check for the 
endogeneity of the OCA properties in the EMU. For the CEECs, we look at the last ten years, 
while for most of the other countries the last twenty years. We also include Russia in our 
investigation to document the shifts in co-movements vis-à-vis this previously important 
trading partner of the CEECs. Second, there are some papers analysing a broader or narrower 
group of CEECs with respect to synchronisation, but these papers analyse GDP or industrial 
production only.
4 We also analyse the major expenditure and sectoral components of GDP. 
From the perspective of OCA and common monetary policy, it is relevant to know to what 
extent are synchronised those components of GDP which drive aggregate demand and 
therefore influence inflation. The analysis of the co-movement of GDP components also 
sheds some further light on the so-called “consumption-correlation puzzle” which is one of 
the six major puzzles in international macroeconomics according to Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2000). Third, in order to make our findings robust, we use five measurements of 
synchronisation, two filtering techniques and two measures of euro area activity. Most 
previous empirical research on CEECs has looked at only cycle correlation with respect to 
Germany as a measure of co-movement. We also analyse leads/lags, volatility and persistence 
of the cycle and a measure of impulse-response. Smaller leads/lags, less volatility, similar 
persistence, and equal impulse-response make the common monetary policy more suited for a 
country participating in a currency union. We made all our calculations with the two most 
popular filtering techniques in the business cycle literature: the Hodrick-Prescott and the 
Band-Pass filters. Both techniques have deficiencies, but if both reveal a similar trend, the 
finding can be regarded as more robust. Finally, as we are more interested in synchronisation 
vis-à-vis the euro area as a whole rather than just Germany, we look at the euro area activity 
against which we measure the synchronisation of individual countries. For this purpose, we 
use an aggregate from the ECB area-wide model database and a common factor calculated by 
us, because the former is more burdened with measurement errors in the pre-1999 period.  
                                                 
3 For an overview of the findings of empirical research on the topic see Rose (2002). 
4 Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt (1999), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001), Boreiko (2002), Frenkel and Nickel 
(2002), Babetski, Boone and Maurel (2002), Korhonen (2003), Fidrmuc (2004). The exceptions are Boone and 
Maurel (1998 and 1999) who also study the unemployment rate. BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONISATION IN THE ENLARGED EU ⏐ 3 
 
It is necessary to say at the outset what are the questions that this paper does not investigate 
empirically. It does not examine the sources of shocks, i.e., whether the business fluctuations 
are caused by supply or demand shocks. Many authors have found that both demand and 
supply shocks contribute to fluctuations, the former dominating in the shorter frequencies and 
the latter becoming important in the longer run
5. Identifying the sources of shocks is 
important because monetary policy can not deal with all types of shocks similarly. However, 
if business cycles are synchronised, it means that most likely the countries are not subject to 
significant asymmetric shocks. Another question our paper does not investigate empirically is 
which are the channels of transmission of business cycles from one country to another. The 
empirical evidence discussed in the literature shows that openness, trade integration and 
similarity of economic structures have a strong effect on international co-movements. 
Investigating the sources of shocks and the transmission mechanism of business cycles remain 
challenging areas of research that exceeds the scope of this paper. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the methodologies and 
Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 presents and discusses the findings. Section 5 
summarises the main findings and concludes. 
2. Methodology 
Perhaps the most popular method in the synchronisation literature of CEECs is the bivariate 
Blanchard–Quah-type SVAR decomposition of supply and demand shocks based on output 
and inflation data.
6 Once supply and demand shocks are identified separately for individual 
CEECs and Germany or the euro area, synchronisation is assessed by the correlation between 
the shocks at home and in Germany/the euro area. However, the use of SVARs is debated 
even for countries having much longer sample periods
7. Imposing long-run identifying 
restriction for six to ten years of data available for the CEECs would not make much sense in 
the framework of the SVAR model. There is also an important problem with the inflation 
rates of CEECs used by the studies, as price developments were heavily affected in the 1990s 
by price and trade liberalisation and administrative price adjustments which led to large 
changes in relative prices. Moreover, some of the inflation data series are not stationary and 
seem to be even an I(2) process (implying an I(3) process for the price level) which raises a 
problem that is quite difficult to handle. 
Due to these theoretical and practical deficiencies of the SVAR technique, we use detrended 
time series as cyclical measures — which are standard in the synchronisation literature — and 
calculate various synchronisation measures based on them. In the following, we describe the 
methodological issues related to detrending, the measurement of the euro area economic 
activity, and the measurement of synchronisation. 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, Blanchard and Quah (1989), Karras (1994) and Bergman (1996). According to the well-
known real business cycle (RBC) model, business fluctuations are caused by exogenous technology shocks.  
However, the RBC model has been criticized, particularly by Summers (1986) and Mankiw (1989) who argue 
that changes in total factor productivity can be explained by aggregate demand impulses rather than exogenous 
productivity shocks. Evans (1992) also argues that the RBC literature has overstated the role of exogenous 
productivity shocks. There are good reviews of the business cycle literature in Kydland and Prescott (1990), 
King and Rebelo (1999) and Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994). 
6See Babetski, Boone and Maurel (2002), Frenkel and Nickel (2002), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001), Frenkel et 
al. (1999), and Csajbók and Csermely eds. (2002).  
7 See, for instance, Faust and Leeper (1997) and Cooley and Dwyer (1998). 4 ⏐ DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
2.1. Detrending 
The first issue we face is detrending. There are various detrending methods adopted in the 
literature and empirical results might depend on the specific filter adopted, as it is 
demonstrated in Canova (1998). Canova compared the properties of the cyclical components 
of seasonally adjusted US data as revealed by various filters and concluded that, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, properties of business cycles vary across detrending methods 
and that alternative detrending methods extract different types of information from the data. 
This result posts a warning sign for empirical business cycle research. In order to make our 
results more robust, we use and compare the results of the two most widely adopted filters in 
the literature, namely the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP) and the Band-Pass filter (BP). Among 
these two, the BP filter is preferable from a theoretical point of view, as argued for instance 
by Stock and Watson (1999), since it intends to eliminate both high frequency fluctuations 
(which might be due to measurement errors and noise) and low frequency fluctuations (which 
rather reflect the long term growth component)
8. However, the BP filter also has weaknesses, 
since in finite samples only various approximations could be used.
9 In particularly, since we 
have only ten years of data for the CEECs, the application of the BP filter, i.e., filtering out 
cycles with less than eight years periodicity, the standard upper band adopted in the literature, 
might be questionable. Therefore, analysing the results based on the two filters increases the 
robustness of our results, even if both of them have deficiencies. The adoption of these two 
filters also allows better comparison of our results to previous empirical research reported in 
the literature.
10 
2.2.  Measuring the euro area economic activity 
We use two measures of euro area economic activity: (1) a euro area aggregate from the ECB 
area-wide model database and (2) a common factor calculated by us. For the area-wide model 
of the ECB, euro area aggregates have been calculated for various series back until 1970
11. 
                                                 
8 Several criticisms of the HP filter have been raised in the literature. Some of the criticisms simply originate 
from the arbitrary choice of the smoothness parameter. In addition, Cogley and Nason (1995) shows that when 
applied to stationary time series (including trend-eliminated trend-stationary series), the HP filter works as a 
high-pass filter, that is, suppresses cycles with higher frequencies while letting low frequency cycles go through 
without change. However, for different stationary series, the HP filter is not a high-pass filter, but suppresses 
high and low frequency cycles and amplifies business cycle frequencies, therefore creating artificial business 
cycles. Similar criticism was voiced by Harvey and Jaeger (1993). They showed that the HP filter creates 
spurious cycles in detrended random walks and I(2) processes, and that the danger of finding large sample cross-
correlations between independent but spurious HP cycles is not negligible. Another important weakness of the 
HP filter is the treatment of sudden structural breaks, as the HP filter smooths out its effect to previous and 
subsequent periods. Moreover, the HP filter works as a symmetric two-sided filter in the middle of the sample, 
but becomes unstable at the end and at the beginning of the sample, although end-point instability is also a 
weakness of BP filter. For both filters, it is recommended that three years at both ends of the sample of the 
filtered series be disregarded. 
9 For the BP filter we adopt the approximation suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003), which is the latest 
among the three mostly commonly adopted approximations in the literature. 
10 As a preliminary check, we also used seasonal differencing, that is, the data in the format that most statistical 
offices of CEECs publish: real growth rates compared to the same quarter of previous year. The results, even for 
the GDP components, were qualitatively the same as the results obtained with the HP and BP filtered seasonally 
adjusted time series. 
11 For a description and further reference for the euro area aggregate national accounts see 
http://www.ecb.int/stats/stats.htm and Fagan et al (2001). The aggregate that we use has constant country 
composition and handles the issue of German unification so that there is no level shift in the series. BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONISATION IN THE ENLARGED EU ⏐ 5 
 
However, these series must include various measurement errors, because quarterly national 
accounts are not available for all countries for earlier years, and because aggregation is 
affected by exchange rate fluctuations when there were separate currencies before 1999. 
Therefore, we also calculated a dynamic factor model for the detrended data of five core 
countries of the EMU in order to identify a common factor vis-à-vis which we can measure 
synchronisation. The countries used for this calculation are France, Germany and Italy, as 
these countries are the three largest in the EMU. Austria and the Netherlands are also included 
as they had fixed exchange rates to the Deutsche mark for a long period of time and were 
highly integrated with the German economy. In principle, we could have calculated the 
common factor of all EMU members and use that as the measure of the euro area economic 
activity. However, individual quarterly time series of all countries are not available for the full 
sample period, so we had to select. The countries selected are those identified also by Artis 
and Zhang (1998) as the “core” EMU countries on the basis of several variables chosen to 
reflect OCA considerations, except that we include Italy and exclude Belgium. 
Dynamic factor models have recently gained renewed interest in the business cycle 
literature
12. In these models, there are unobservable measures of economic activity. These 
unobserved measures are either common factor(s) (for all or some groups of the 
countries/series analysed) or idiosyncratic factors. For example, analysing a single indicator 
like GDP, the following model might describe the transmission of the euro area business 
cycles among k countries: 
k i u z z
u z z
k i u z z y
t i t i i t i
EU
t
EU
t
EU EU
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t i t i i
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where  t i y ,  is the detrended
13 GDP of country i, 
EU
t z is the (unobservable) index of European 
activity, i.e. the common factor, and  t i z ,  is the (unobservable) index of country specific 
economic activity not explained by the common factor. Hence, this formulation allows the 
adoption of the standard assumption behind empirical state-space models of no 
contemporaneous or lagged correlation among the error terms of the equations. The β-s and γ-
s are parameters to be estimated along with the standard errors of the innovations. Note that 
there are k+1 state equations and k observation equations leading to a large number of 
estimated parameters even in the case of independent errors. 
Before estimation, we standardised the cyclical components of individual countries, which is 
a standard procedure in the literature. The reason for that is to have equal variances across 
countries in order to have the possibility of an equal role in the common factor. As smaller 
countries tend to have more volatile cycles than large countries
14, small countries would 
receive higher weights without the transformation. Standardisation ensures that all series are 
treated symmetrically, which does not imply that the common factor will explain equal 
portions of the variance of the standardised individual series. Since the common factor is 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Gregory et al. (1997), Stock and Watson (1998), Forni and Reichlin (1998), Gregory and 
Head (1999), Forni et al. (2000), Kose et al. (2003), Monfort et al. (2003), Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) and 
Giannone et al. (2003). 
13 We calculate the common factor for both HP and BP filtered series. 
14 See, for instance, Gerlach (1988) and Head (1995). 6 ⏐ DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
estimated from standardised series, it will be no point to talk about the variance of the 
common factor, so that when we turn to the volatility of the cycles, only the results for the 
euro area aggregate will be analysed.  
There are various ways to estimate dynamic factor models. We chose the maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation and Kalman-filtering of the state-space representation. Our choice 
stems from the small number of cross section units (five) which makes it virtually impossible 
to adopt other methods (e.g., the dynamic principal component analysis) requiring large cross 
sections. Our small cross-section leads to a reasonably small number of parameters to be 
estimated, hence the computation difficulties indicated by, for instance, Gregory et al. (1997) 
does not arise in our case. Indeed, our estimation converged to a unique maximum for various 
starting values. 
2.3.  Measures of synchronisation 
We use five measures to assess synchronisation. Since we are interested in the analysis of 
temporal change in the synchronisation of business cycles, we calculated our measures for 
various sub-periods. Note, however, that detrending and calculation of the common factor 
was performed for the longest available sample of each series.  
1.  Correlation. Contemporaneous unconditional correlation between the business cycle of 
the euro area and that of individual countries in different time periods. We use non-
overlapping five-year long periods to study the changing pattern of correlations. We also 
calculated five-year rolling sample correlations, which led to similar results. We have 
therefore chosen the simpler way for expositional reasons. 
2.  Leads or lags. We calculated the lead/lag for which the unconditional correlation is the 
largest. The interpretation of the results for this measure is the following: a value of zero 
indicates that contemporaneous correlation is the highest, negative values indicate that the 
euro area leads the country studied, while a positive number indicates the reverse. We 
have checked the values for up to 3 in order not to decrease the degrees of freedom too 
much, so the value of 3 indicates that the lead/lag is 3 or larger. From the perspective of 
optimum currency area, zero or small lead/lag would be optimal. 
3.  Volatility of the cycles. We defined volatility as the squared deviation from the mean of 
the cycle, i.e., from zero. In order to evaluate the results more easily, we have normalised 
the values relative to the euro area.  
4.  Persistence. The dynamic effect of any shocks depends on the persistence of the series: 
for highly persistent series, the shock has a long-lasting effect, while for weakly persistent 
series the effect of the shock diminishes sooner. Consequently, from the perspective of 
synchronisation, similar persistence is rather important. The measure we use is the first 
order autocorrelation coefficient of the cycle. Persistence defined this way reflects a 
mixture of the effects of various shocks and the effects of transmission mechanism 
through which these shocks pass on to the economies. Some shocks could have longer-
term effects while others might diminish sooner, and some economies could react to a 
given shock differently than the other. Therefore, this simple measure does not allow the 
identification of the relative importance of various shocks and the way the economies 
react to them; rather this measure reflects the aggregate effect of the similarities of shocks 
and their transmission. We do not formulate any normative statement on whether a "high" 
or a "low"' persistence is better, we are simply interested in whether persistence is similar 
across countries. As it is documented in the literature, the estimation of autocorrelation BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONISATION IN THE ENLARGED EU ⏐ 7 
 
coefficients is downward biased in the case of large outliers and it is also documented that 
for noisy series the autocorrelation coefficient tends to be smaller. Therefore, our measure 
also gives an indication of the possible presence of outliers and noise in the series which, 
again, should be small when there are no country specific shocks. 
5.  Impulse-response.  The accumulated effect (up to six quarters) of a euro area shock 
(proxied as a shock to the common factor) on the individual countries. When correlation is 
contemporaneous and large and the volatility and the persistence of the cycle is the same 
as in the euro area, then this measure will not deliver results different from the previous 
ones. However, whenever any of the above conditions are not satisfied, then it can give an 
additional indicator of synchronisation by showing a measure of the magnitude of the 
impact of a euro area shock. Moreover, by calculating the impact from a VAR, which by 
definition includes own lags as well, this indicator can assess whether the results from the 
previous unconditional correlation coefficient are blurred by persistence. To some extent, 
this can be regarded as a summary measure of the previous four measures of 
synchronisation. The six-quarter period for adding up the responses was selected to 
measure the cumulative impact for a period which is usually regarded as the one during 
which monetary policy takes its effect. 
The impulse-responses were calculated from three-variable VARs including the common 
factor, the euro area aggregate, and the individual country studied. We calculated our measure 
based on the “generalised impulse-response function” of Pesaran and Shin (1998), which is 
independent of the ordering of the variables.  The lag lengths of the VARs were selected with 
Sims’s likelihood-ratio test for each country, with six lags being the largest possible value. 
We calculated the accumulated impulse-response up to six quarters and normalised it with the 
effect of the common factor on the euro area itself. Therefore, the value of one indicates 
perfect synchronisation according to this measure. Due to the large number of parameters to 
be estimated, we estimated the models for the most recent ten-year long period of 1993-2002, 
hence we cannot study the temporal change in the impact.
15 We look at the impulse-response 
only for GDP, not its components. 
3. Data 
We include in our study the eight CEECs (Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia), ten members of the EMU (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal)
16, and various other 
countries as a control group. The latter includes the EMU-outs (Denmark, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom), the other European countries (Switzerland and Norway), the United States 
and Japan to represent the other two main economic areas, and also Russia to represent the 
country which was formerly the most important trading partner of CEECs. The role of the 
control group is to assess whether there is evidence of the endogeneity of the OCA properties 
in the EMU and whether there is evidence of a “world business cycle”. 
Our analysis covers GDP and its major expenditure and sectoral components: private 
consumption, investments, exports, imports, industrial production, and services. We do not 
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include government consumption as it is a policy-driven aggregate, the analysis of which falls 
outside of the scope of this paper. Furthermore, we do not study agricultural production and 
construction which have a small share in GDP and are subject to country specific shocks, such 
as seasonal factors (agriculture) or policies (for instance, housing subsidies or the availability 
of mortgage loans). 
Our sample includes quarterly data between 1983-2002 grouped in four non-overlapping five-
year periods: 1983-87; 1988-92; 1993-97 and 1998-2002.
17 Most of our data are from the 
OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts database. The other sources and a full description of 
data availability are detailed in the Data Appendix. Unfortunately, not all time series are 
available for the full period. Most notably, CEECs’ times series start only in 1993
18, but data 
for expenditure and sectoral components of GDP are not available for all CEECs, and some of 
the available data starts later than 1993. For the euro area aggregate, the sectoral breakdown 
of GDP is available only since 1991, hence industrial production and services are studied only 
for the period since 1991. 
4. Results 
Since we examine a relatively large number of countries (26) and use two measures of euro 
area economic activity, two filters and five measures of synchronisation, and since we look at 
several measures of economic activity (GDP and its components) during consecutive five-
year long periods, it would be cumbersome to show all the results. Therefore, we first analyse 
the co-movement in GDP cycles in detail and continue with a less detailed description of the 
results for the rest of the aggregates, underlying the similarities and differences with the 
findings for GDP. Moreover, we present only the point estimate of various statistics but not 
their confidence bands for three reasons. First, for the large number of statistics we calculate, 
reporting their confidence bands would overburden the presentation and interpretation of 
results. Second, as we use filtered series which are themselves burdened with measurement 
errors, the confidence bands, calculated by standard ways, could reflect only the uncertainty 
related to estimation, but not the uncertainty inherent in the filtered series. Third, the various 
sub-samples we use allow the analysis of stability in the statistics, which is an indirect 
indication of the uncertainty of the estimates. 
4.1.  Gross Domestic Product 
GDP is the most inclusive measure of economic activity and is therefore a useful proxy for 
overall business cycle, even though technically business cycles are defined as co-movements 
of many aggregates. A large amount of empirical work in the business cycle and 
synchronisation literature has used the GDP data. For a quick visual test, Figures 1/a-b-c show 
the cycles calculated with the HP (left column) and BP (right column) filters for the three 
country groups: CEECs, EMU and control group. We plot Russia in the Figure showing the 
cycles of the CEECs. The cycle of the euro area aggregate appears in all figures as the 
reference value. In general, the visual impression indicates a rather strong co-movement with 
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the euro area for most EMU members, somewhat less for the control group countries, 
although Switzerland stands out as a country well synchronised, and an even smaller or no co-
movement for the CEECs, with the notable exception of Hungary, Poland and Slovenia which 
exhibit significant synchronisation in the most recent period. As for the main economic areas, 
the US seems to lead and Japan to lag the European cycle. We quantify these visual 
impressions one by one below. 
4.1.1.  Cycle correlation 
Figures 2/a-b look at the evolution over time of correlation: Figure 2/a shows the 
contemporaneous correlation coefficients between the cycle of the euro area aggregate and the 
individual countries’ cycles, while Figure 2/b shows the correlations using the common 
factor. The left column of panels shows the correlations based on the HP filter and the right 
column those based on the BP filter. The three rows of panels show results for the CEECs, the 
EMU members and the control group countries. 
Among the CEECs, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia show strong improvement in cyclical 
correlation from the 1993-97 period to the 1998-2002 period. However, the other five CEECs 
show almost no tendency to move toward greater synchronisation during this period.  It is 
useful to look at the shifts in correlations of the CEECs vis-à-vis Russia, formerly their most 
important trading partner. Figure 3 crossplots the correlation with both the euro area and 
Russia in 1993-97 and in 1998-02. In 1993-97, the three Baltic states correlated quite strongly 
with Russia, with coefficients ranging between 0.4-0.7, but the other CEECs did not exhibit 
any correlation in this period. By 1998-2002, correlation of the Baltic states with Russia 
declined substantially, while the correlation of the other CEECs increased, though it remained 
weak, except for the Czech Republic. 
The strong correlation between the business cycles of the Baltic States and Russia in the 
earlier period is not surprising given that these states were part of the Soviet Union. Following 
the independence of the Baltic countries, their integration into the Russian economy came 
loose and their trade shifted increasingly toward Western countries. The lack of correlation of 
the other CEECs with Russia in the period 1993-97 is a result of both the collapse of trade 
with the Soviet Union and the rapid restructuring of trade of the CEECs toward the EU. The 
correlation of the Czech Republic seems to be a coincidence induced by the effects of 
independent currency crises — in the Czech Republic in 1997 and in Russia in 1998 — which 
led to a decline in GDP in both countries. It is noteworthy that the business cycle of Russia 
itself became more correlated with the EMU cycle between the two periods under 
consideration, an indication that Russia also is increasingly integrated into the world 
economy. 
The EMU member countries have become more synchronised over time according to all the 
correlation measures calculated. The movement toward greater synchronisation is particularly 
evident since 1993, the start of the run-up to the European Monetary Union.  
Figure 4 shows in a more telling way the level of correlation for all countries for the most 
recent five-year period of 1998-2002 between the cycles of the euro area aggregate and 
individual countries (panel a) and between the cycles of the common factor and individual 
countries (panels b). There are two columns for each countries showing the correlation based 
on the HP-filter (left column) and BP-filter (right column). The countries are arranged in 
decreasing order of correlation based on the HP-filtered series. 10 ⏐ DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
The three leading CEECs mentioned above (Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) clearly stand out: 
the values of their correlation coefficients are comparable to that of several current EMU 
member states. On the other hand, the other five CEECs show zero co-movement or even 
counter-movement. Among current EMU-members, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands are the most synchronised, while Portugal, Finland, and Ireland show the 
least correlation. Interestingly, some of the control group countries are more synchronised 
than these three smaller EMU-members. The most notable example is Switzerland, which 
shows as high a correlation as the most synchronised EMU members. The UK and Sweden 
also reveal stronger synchronisation than the above mentioned three EMU-members.  
4.1.2.  Leads and lags in the cycles 
Tables 1/a-b show the values of the leads/lags in the business cycles for the highest 
correlation value between the euro area and the individual countries examined.
19 The three 
leading CEECs perform the best in this respect as well, having zero or close to zero phase 
shift in the most recent period. The other CEECs show a diverse picture with greater 
leads/lags. The tendency of almost all Western European countries to move toward 
contemporaneous correlation is further evidence of a strong business cycle synchronisation in 
Europe. It is noteworthy that the US led the European cycle in the past 15 years while Japan 
lagged the European cycle in the past decade. 
4.1.3.  Volatility of the business cycles 
Table 2 shows the volatilities of the individual countries’ business cycles vis-à-vis the EMU 
aggregate business cycle. Two main observations can be made from an examination of the 
data. First, as reported also by Gerlach (1988) and Head (1995), smaller countries exhibit 
larger fluctuations. Gerlach speculates that possible explanations for this phenomenon are that 
larger countries may be more diversified, and small, more open economies may be subject to 
more foreign disturbances. The latter argument is not supported by the examples of Austria, 
Denmark and Switzerland which show even smaller volatilities than the large countries. Since 
these countries pursued stability oriented economic policies which were reflected in the 
stability of their currencies and inflation rates, it is more likely that economic policy plays an 
important role in cyclical volatility. Second, there has been a clear trend toward a reduction in 
volatility in all countries. For the EMU members and the control group countries, this decline 
is most evident if one looks at the whole period of twenty years examined from 1983-87 to 
1998-2002. The decline in volatility is also evident for most of the CEECs over the last ten 
years. Hungary and Slovenia show the smallest volatility of cycles among CEECs, with 
amplitudes lower then in many current eurozone members. Poland and the Czech Republic 
also exhibit relatively low volatility. 
The long-term decline in output volatility has been demonstrated for the US by Blanchard and 
Simon (2001). According to their findings, this decline can be traced to a decrease in the 
volatility of consumption and investment. Factors mentioned by the authors that may have 
contributed to this development are improvements in financial markets allowing better risk 
sharing and improvement in the conduct of monetary policy which led to a reduction in 
inflation volatility. These factors have probably also played a role in the decline of the 
European countries’ relative volatility vis-à-vis the euro area cycle. It is interesting to note 
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that in the leading CEECs, the volatility is about the same as in the EMU countries in the 
period 1998-2002. This would indicate that the role of country specific shocks has greatly 
diminished in these countries (see below). 
4.1.4.  Persistence of the business cycles 
Figure 5 shows the evolution over time of the first order autocorrelation coefficient, arranged 
the same way as Figure 2. From the 1993-97 to the 1998-2002 period, persistence in the 
cycles of CEECs tended to increase, which is indication of diminishing role of country 
specific shocks. There is only one country, Slovenia, whose value is substantially smaller than 
that of other CEECs, which is surprising based on our previous results on correlation, 
leads/lags, and volatility.  
In the case of EMU members, the figure clearly illustrates a movement toward similar 
persistence, as in the 1980s and early 1990s the autocorrelation coefficients were rather 
scattered, but have become higher and dense by the final period. This again illustrates the 
increased synchronisation in the EMU. Ireland, whose quarterly data is available only for the 
final period, is the exception, but this is not surprising given the highly noisy cyclical measure 
shown in Figure 1/b. 
4.1.5.  Impulse-response 
Figure 6 shows the relative impact of a euro area shock on the individual countries, based on 
estimations for the 1993-2002 period. A value of one indicates a full transmittal of euro area 
shock to the cycle of the country, while a larger (smaller) value indicates greater (lesser) 
sensitivity; a value of zero means no transmittal at all. Among CEECs, Slovenia and Poland 
are the most sensitive to euro area shocks followed by Hungary, but even these three leading 
CEECs show lesser sensitivity to euro area shocks than most current EMU members. Taking 
into account the high contemporaneous correlation and the similarity in volatility of the above 
three CEECs with the cycle of the euro area, this result is likely due to the lower persistence 
of their cycles which is probably a reflection of differences in economic structures. The other 
five CEECs show zero sensitivity or even a counter cyclical pattern, which would indicate 
that their economic structures are even more divergent. Among EMU countries, Ireland stands 
out as the most sensitive country, since a shock has twice as big an effect than the effect of a 
shock on most of the other EMU countries. This result is likely the consequence of the 
extraordinary high growth rate of the Irish economy in the period considered, which could 
have led to higher cyclical volatility and sensitivity to foreign shocks.  
4.1.6.  Methodological differences 
In the above paragraphs, we highlighted the main findings, without discussing the differences 
resulting from the use of the two filtering techniques and the two different measures of euro 
area economic activity. The most important observation one can make is that the differences 
are not large enough to change the results or give reason to modify the interpretations. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning them. As for the two filtering techniques, HP tends to 
reveal stronger synchronisation and higher persistence than BP for the EMU members and the 
control group. This is not surprising based on the results of Cogley and Nason (1995) who, as 
mentioned earlier, showed that the HP filter tends to amplify the business cycle frequencies. 
For the CEEC countries, on the other hand, the two filters give similar results, which is 
probably due to the shorter time period examined for these countries.  12 ⏐ DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
Comparing the results based on the euro area aggregate and the common factor, it is 
interesting to note that correlation coefficients tend to be less dispersed in the case of the 
common factor. Table 3 shows the dispersion of correlation coefficients in three country 
groups: (1) the 5 EMU-members that were used to calculate the common factor; (2) four other 
EMU-members
20; and (3) four non-EMU European countries. For the second and third groups 
of countries, the difference is smaller when using the common factor than when using the 
eurozone aggregate, irrespective of which filtering technique is used. This indicates that the 
group of countries which includes the three largest EMU countries (Germany, France, Italy) 
captures well the euro area “common cycle”. 
4.1.7.  Summing up 
Before proceeding further with the examination of the cyclical behaviour of GDP 
components, let us sum up the main findings of the cyclical co-movements of GDP. 
1.  Among the CEECs, all measures of co-movements for Hungary, Poland and Slovenia 
point toward increased and significant synchronisation with the eurozone business cycle. 
As mentioned earlier, Frankel and Rose (1998) document a positive relationship between 
trade integration and synchronisation. Figure 7 shows the share of the EMU in the export 
of the CEECs. For the above mentioned three CEECs, that share is among the highest. 
Imbs (2003) estimates by a system of simultaneous equations the relative contributions of 
trade, finance and specialisation to international co-movements. The author finds that the 
overall effect of trade is strong, but that it works mostly through intra-industry rather than 
inter-industry trade. Fontagné and Freudenberg (1999) make a distinction between 
horizontal (two-way trade in varieties) and vertical (two-way trade in qualities) intra-
industry trade and argue that it is the former which leads to greater synchronisation. 
Intra-industry trade between the EU and the CEECs has been studied by Fidrmuc (2001a 
and 2004). Fidrmuc finds that the Grubel-Lloyd (GL) index of intra-industry trade in 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia is high, as high as in some EMU members, and that it is 
very low in the Baltic countries which exhibit little or no co-movement in our 
calculations. Smaller intra-industry trade could be, therefore, one of the reasons for the 
lack of synchronisation in the Baltic countries. In his 2004 paper, he regresses the 
correlation of business cycles among some OECD countries (not including CEECs) and 
finds that the GL index is an important explanatory variable. In spite of the success in 
explaining correlations of OECD countries, the GL index has weaknesses in measuring 
intra-industry trade. First, the sub-sectors adopted should be reasonably large to include 
all possible vertical links, which is difficult to determine. Second, the GL measure 
introduces a bias for small countries with high current account deficits, which are the 
characteristics of some CEECs, especially the Baltics. Frankel (2004) doubts the 
usefulness of distinguishing between intra-industry and inter-industry trade from the 
perspective of synchronisation. He notes that trade in inputs and intermediate products, 
constituting as it does a large share of today’s trade, gives rise to positive correlations and 
yet it may be recorded as inter-industry trade. 
2.  There is clear evidence of increased synchronisation within the eurozone, particularly 
since the start of the run-up to EMU. This would, prima facie, strengthen the argument of 
the endogeneity of OCA properties as argued by Frankel and Rose (1998). To an extent 
this is no doubt the case, but other factors must also be at work, since several of the 
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control group countries, including the U.S. and Japan and, to a lesser extent, also Russia, 
have also become more synchronised with the EMU. These results lend support to the 
empirical evidence for a world business cycle reported by several studies, such as, for 
example, Gerlach (1988), Lumsdaine and Prasad (1997) and Kose et al. (2003). 
4.2.  Industry and Trade 
4.2.1.  Industrial Production 
We continue the analysis with the second most frequently analysed series of the 
synchronisation literature: industrial production. Figure 8 shows the evolution of the 
correlations of industrial production cycles of individual countries vis-à-vis the euro area 
aggregate cycle. Hungary had a high level of correlation already in the 1993-97 period, but 
the other two leading CEECs, Poland and Slovenia, made good progress toward 
synchronisation. Previous studies (for instance, Fidrmuc 2001b, Korhonen 2003 and Fidrmuc 
2004) also tended to conclude that Hungary and Slovenia are well integrated, but among 
recent papers, only Boreiko (2002) found high correlation for Poland. It is interesting to note 
that the Czech Republic and Estonia also made some progress in synchronisation, in contrast 
to the results observed for GDP. Among EMU countries, the synchronisation in Portugal 
increased substantially since 1993-97 to join the already high level of synchronisation of the 
other eurozone countries. In the control group, the UK and the Swiss cycles became more 
synchronised with a level as high or higher than several EMU members. These results 
confirm the findings of Kaufmann (2003), who showed with a Bayesian cluster analysis of 
industrial production growth rates that EMU members belong to the same cluster and that the 
UK and Switzerland follow more closely the European rather than the overseas cycles.  
Figure 9 shows the level of correlations between the cycles of the euro area aggregate and 
individual countries in the most recent five-year period of 1998Q1-2002Q4. Again, the three 
leading CEECs stand out as having the highest level of correlation, comparable to that of the 
EMU members. 
The evolution of the leads/lags of the cycles shows increased contemporaneous co-movement 
both for the three leading CEECs and all EMU members. Our persistence measure indicates 
similar or even larger values than most EMU members for the three leading CEECs and the 
Czech Republic, which could indicate that the role of country specific shocks were even less 
then in the EMU countries.  
The high level of synchronisation of industrial production in the EMU members and also in 
several CEECs is not surprising, since industry generates a large proportion of foreign trade, 
which is one of the main channels through which synchronisation can occur. In order to 
examine this question empirically, we continue with the analysis of exports and imports. 
4.2.2.  Trade 
Figure 10 shows the correlation coefficients of export cycles. The evolution of the correlation 
coefficients and the leads/lags indicate a strong improvement in synchronisation in all country 
groups, which is an indication of the globalised world of trade. The level of correlation is also 
very high in almost all countries and even exceeds the values observed for industrial 
production. Among the CEECs, in addition to the three leading countries, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia also indicate high levels of correlation, in contrast to the case of GDP and 
industrial production. The only two countries standing out of the general trend are Norway 14 ⏐ DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
and especially Russia, which could be explained by the specific commodity structure (oil) of 
their exports. Import cycles exhibit very similar trends, although the levels of correlation are 
somewhat lower, with the exception of Hungary (Figure 11). The lower level of import co-
movement across countries could be explained by the fact that imports are more sensitive to 
country specific shocks, such as government spending and changes in consumption behaviour 
(see below). 
4.3.  Consumption, services and investment 
We now turn to the analysis of the more domestically oriented expenditure components of 
GDP and start with private consumption. We only look at private consumption, since 
government consumption can be regarded as a policy-driven component, the synchronisation 
of which, if any, is driven by policy actions. While in the EMU adherence to the Maastricht 
criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact may be a factor pushing toward greater fiscal policy 
synchronisation, this is not the case in the CEECs for the time being. 
There is a branch of business cycle literature that looks at the correlation across countries of 
consumption in comparison to output. The prediction of various one-good, complete-markets 
models is that consumption should be correlated across countries even if output does not 
correlate. The reason is that international risk sharing allows the separation of consumption 
from country specific income shocks. This result shows up both in simple two period 
optimising models even when the coefficients of risk aversion and the subjective discount 
factors differ across countries (see, for example Chapter 5 of Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996), and 
in calibrated international real business cycle models (see, for example, Backus, Kehoe and 
Kydland, 1992). However, empirical studies have found that consumption is generally less 
synchronised across countries then GDP, which is regarded as one of the six major puzzles in 
international macroeconomics by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and is referred to as the 
“consumption-correlation puzzle”. For instance, in a comprehensive paper Ambler et al 
(2004) extend the country coverage of previous papers by studying twenty industrial countries 
and consider all pairwise cross-country correlations, for the sample of 1960Q1-2000Q4, 
which is also broken into two sub-periods at 1973. They conclude that the low cross-country 
correlation of consumption is the most important discrepancy with theory.
21 Factors most of 
the time mentioned in the literature contributing to this “puzzle” are non-traded goods, 
imperfection of financial market integration that hinders risk pooling and consumption 
smoothing, the presence of durable goods in consumption, imperfect competition, and trade 
costs. 
Our data confirm that consumption is generally less synchronised than GDP. What is 
interesting from our perspective is that the co-movement of private consumption has 
increased in all the eurozone countries since 1993-97 and in several of the control group 
countries as well, except in Denmark, Japan and Russia (Figure 12). Moreover, in most of the 
countries the increase in consumption correlation is larger than the increase in output 
correlation, as it is shown by Figure 13. The persistence of consumption cycles has also 
became more similar in the EMU (except Ireland) and in most of the control countries as well 
(Figure 14). This would indicate that the influence of the above mentioned factors that are 
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behind the smaller co-movement of private consumption across countries has been greatly 
diminished within the eurozone and, interestingly, also between the eurozone and the US. 
More globalised financial markets with fewer information barriers, less trade frictions and 
fewer asymmetric shocks are likely to be behind this development. Regarding international 
risk sharing, Figures 15/a and 15/b show that the stock of foreign assets and liabilities (FDI 
and portfolio investments in bonds and shares) rose indeed very sharply in the industrial 
world in the last ten years, a phenomenon observed in both EMU and non-EMU countries.
22 
This suggests the international consumption-correlation puzzle could further lessen in the 
future. 
The picture is very different when we look at the CEECs. Only Poland, and to a lesser extent 
Lithuania, show some increase toward greater co-movement, while the other countries have a 
negative correlation with the EMU aggregate, and the movement has been toward greater 
asynchronicity.
23 The volatility of cycle relative to the euro area is also generally larger than 
in the case of output (compare Tables 2 and 4). We can only speculate about the reasons of 
this development. Trade and capital flows have been liberalised during the period under 
review which would argue in favour of greater, not smaller co-movement. However, capital 
movement liberalisation has been more gradual than trade liberalisation in a number of 
CEECs. Furthermore, information barriers and stronger home bias in the financial markets 
due to the fact that capital markets had been restricted for many decades before the reforms 
have certainly contributed to weak risk pooling and less consumption smoothing. As Figure 
15/c shows, the stock of assets invested abroad by the CEECs is negligible in sharp contrast 
with the development observed in the other countries examined. 
Moreover, part of the causes for the lack of co-movement in consumption can probably be 
traced back to the asymmetric shocks these countries were exposed to and the way in which 
private consumption reacted to them. As known, all CEECs experienced a sharp contraction 
in incomes in the early part of the 1990s as a result of the collapse of trade with the former 
Soviet Union and the market oriented reforms (price and trade liberalisation, reduction in 
subsidies, increase in inflation). This led to sharp reductions in consumption. When things 
turned for the better after the mind-1990s as the reforms gained hold and the new investments 
matured into production, the pent-up consumption demand, fuelled sometimes by loose fiscal 
policy and high wage increases, led to a strong growth in consumption. These developments, 
which did not occur at the same time in all CEECs,  surely contributed to the observed lack of 
co-movement in private consumption vis-à-vis the EMU cycle. The move toward 
synchronisation in Poland could be explained by the fact that GDP growth recovered faster in 
Poland then in the other CEECs which led to an earlier return to more normal patterns of 
private consumption. That the CEECs were subject to grater shocks is also reflected in the 
much higher volatility and larger leads/lags of private consumption compared to the euro area 
and the control group countries.  
The above considerations make us believe that the lack of co-movement in private 
consumption is a temporary phenomenon which will turn around as agents become better 
informed about and more familiarised with the possibilities of risk pooling and, more 
importantly, as the effects of reform-induced shocks will fade away and consumption patterns 
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will assume a smoother long-term pattern. It will be interesting to redo our calculations a few 
years from now to test this assumption. 
Since services account for a large part of consumption, not surprisingly they exhibit similar 
trends as private consumption: increase in synchronisation in the eurozone and the control 
group countries and decrease in the CEECs, except in Poland and Slovakia. Volatilities and 
leads/lags are also larger and persistence is lower in the CEECs then in the euro area and the 
control group countries. 
The cyclical correlation of investment is not very different from that observed for 
consumption (Figure 16). In the eurozone, one can observe a trend toward greater co-
movement since 1993-97, although the level of synchronisation is generally lower than for 
GDP or its other expenditure components. It is interesting to point out the increased co-
movement of the US and Japan with the EMU cycle. This again lends support to the argument 
that the business cycle of major countries is becoming more globalised and that there is a 
world business cycle. As for the CEECs, only Poland and Hungary show some moves toward 
greater synchronisation. Not surprisingly, the volatility of investment in the CEECs is higher 
then in the other countries, as investments have been very much influenced by the pace of the 
reforms, in particular privatisation and the associated FDI inflows. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the business cycle synchronisation in the new EU members of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the eurozone countries, together with a control group countries. We 
analyse GDP and its major expenditure and sectoral components. From the perspective of 
common monetary policy, it is relevant to know to what extent are synchronised those 
components of GDP which drive aggregate demand and therefore influence inflation. To 
make our findings more robust, we use five measures of synchronisation, two filtering 
techniques and two measures of euro area economic activity against which we measure the 
co-movements of individual countries’ business cycles. One of our goals was to assess the 
current degree of synchronisation of the CEECs and to see to what extent they are satisfying 
one of the OCA criteria, namely, the synchronisation of their business cycles with the euro 
area. Our second goal was to see whether synchronisation in the eurozone countries has 
increased in the run-up period to the EMU and since the start of the monetary union in order 
to test for OCA endogeneity. If there is evidence of such endogeneity, than CEECs can expect 
that once they are members of the EMU, their business cycles will start moving toward 
greater synchronisation and they will need to be less concerned with initial idiosyncrasies. 
The empirical evidence suggests a number of conclusions of which we would like to 
emphasise the following. 
In Tables 5-8 we have grouped the countries according to their degree of synchronisation. We 
reverse the order followed so far and start with the EMU countries, which we can split into 
two groups: the “core” countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands) which show higher synchronisation, and the “peripheric” countries (Finland, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain) which exhibit lower co-movement. We also grouped together the 
three EMU-outs (Denmark, Sweden, the UK) and Switzerland, and show separately the US, 
Japan, and Russia. 
It is remarkable that the core EMU countries show a high degree of synchronisation according 
to all the measures we use (high correlation, low volatility, small leads/lags, similar and high 
persistence, similar impulse-response) and this not only for GDP, but for its components as BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONISATION IN THE ENLARGED EU ⏐ 17 
 
well. The synchronisation has significantly increased between 1993-97 and 1998-2002, a 
period consisting of the run-up to EMU, followed by membership in the monetary union. For 
the peripheric EMU countries, the same overall trends can be observed, but their level of 
synchronisation is less advanced, particularly for consumption and services. It is noteworthy 
that five out of the six core countries are the original funding members of the EU and the 
sixth, Austria, has had a fix exchange rate to the Deutsche mark since the mid-1970s. The 
peripheric countries had lower income per capita and were on a catch-up growth path toward 
the average of EU level, which could be a reason for the slower convergence in business 
cycles, since the catch-up period could be accompanied by more intensive country specific 
shocks and uncertainties. Another reason could be that these countries joined the EU much 
later, hence they integrated into the EU trade later. Mitchell and Mouratidis (2003) also 
document an increase in the business cycle correlation in the eurozone, but they only analyse 
industrial production. Our study supports more broadly this trend and is thus more 
convincing. 
Are the above trends evidence of the endogeneity of OCA? At first glance one could argue 
that yes, because synchronisation has increased in all EMU members since the start of the 
run-up to EMU, when countries begun a process of meeting the Maastricht criteria of nominal 
convergence to be ready to adopt the euro in 1999. The reason why one can not be 
unambiguous about this interpretation is that the non-EMU European countries and even the 
US and to some extent Japan and Russia have also shown greater co-movement with the euro 
cycle. This points toward the emergence of a “world business cycle” noted also by several 
authors. 
Nevertheless, there are also some good news for the advocates of OCA endogeneity. First, the 
extent of synchronisation is very high within the EMU core countries and the peripheric EMU 
countries have been moving toward that level. Second, synchronisation has become high even 
for the traditionally less synchronised components of GDP, namely private consumption and 
services. Consumption, however, remains less synchronised than GDP. Our findings thus 
confirm the consumption-correlation puzzle, but they also show that this phenomenon is 
becoming significantly less important. Greater financial integration, more competition, 
reduced trade costs, including the elimination of separate currencies, and converging policies 
on the way to and within EMU have surely played a role in the greater business cycle 
synchronisation. However, business cycle correlation is an evolutionary process and as 
Rogoff’s (2001) Nail Soup story reminds us, we can not attribute all of the causes to one 
single ingredient, the euro. That said, it can be argued that the strong business cycle 
correlations observed in the EMU countries make the common monetary policy more suited 
and less of a problem for the current participants of the monetary union. 
Turning to the CEECs, we can split them into three distinct groups: Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia (labelled as CEE1 in the Tables 5-8), which are the most synchronised; the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia (CEE2), which are less synchronised; and the Baltic States (CEE3), 
which are not synchronised at all. 
It is quite remarkable that in the three leading countries in the first group, synchronisation for 
GDP, industrial production and exports has improved dramatically to reach by 1998-2002 
levels that are similar to that in the core EMU countries and even higher than in the EMU 
peripheric countries. Within a short period of time, these three CEECs were able to 
completely restructure their production and orient their exports away from the Eastern Block 
and toward the EU, leading to strong correlation with the euro area business cycle. 
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synchronisation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia is most likely due to the insufficient 
reforms and macroeconomic imbalances in the first half of the 1990s, leading to currency 
crises in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1997 and 1998, respectively, followed by a 
recession. Since the reforms have been accelerated and growth has resumed, these two 
countries will most probably reach as high a level of synchronisation as the leading CEECs in 
the coming years. 
The lack of synchronisation in the Baltic countries is probably a reflection of the shocks that 
they experienced in the wake of the Russian crisis of 1998. The economic and trade links of 
the Baltic countries with Russia at the time were much more extensive than was the case for 
the other CEECs. This is reflected in the significant positive correlation with the Russian 
business cycle in 1993-97, which however declined to close to zero or even to negative value 
by 1998-2002. Another factor already discussed in the paper could be the smaller share of 
intra-industry trade between the EU and the Baltic States. Finally, the Baltic countries’ trade 
links with the Nordic countries are important and, as we have seen, the synchronisation of the 
Nordic countries with the eurozone is not as strong. 
In all the CEECs there is minimal or even negative correlation with the EMU cycle of private 
consumption and hence also of services. Consumption represents an important share in 
aggregate demand and the question can be asked whether it is wise for a country to give up 
monetary policy independence if there is no correlation in consumption, even though there is 
high correlation for GDP, driven by industrial production and export correlation. This 
question has to be looked at from several perspectives. First, we have argued in the paper that 
the lack of consumption correlation is due to sudden shifts in consumption behaviour and 
weak risk pooling, owing to greater information barrier and home bias in the financial assets 
markets. We believe that the influences of these factors are diminishing and that the lack of 
private consumption correlation is a temporary phenomenon. 
Second, there is the question of sufficiency. As pointed out by Artis (2003), there is nothing 
in the relevant theory to establish what is a needed degree of synchronisation to participate in 
a currency union. It may be enough to be assured that the new entrant is not substantially 
more idiosyncratic then those already in. The Five Tests study by HM Treasury (2003) 
looking at the United States as a monetary union concludes that a currency union can prosper 
with quite varied regional business cycles. This is because financial market integration, price 
and wage flexibility and labour market mobility can help adjust to idiosyncratic shocks. 
However, if wages are sticky and labour mobility is restricted by language and cultural 
barriers, the argument can be made that if cycles of major components of aggregate demand 
are very divergent, giving up monetary policy independence might not be the optimal 
solution. A counter argument is that, as discussed, participation in a currency union may itself 
lead to greater synchronisation of business cycles. Furthermore, for small open economies 
like the CEECs, the room to follow independent monetary policy is rather limited and the 
arguments of Buiter (2000) and Artis and Ehrmann (2000) that exchange rate flexibility can 
be as much a source of shocks as a shock absorber is to be reckoned with. Finally, one has to 
look at the counterfactual as well and ask the question whether the arguments in favour of 
retaining monetary independence are strong enough to negate the benefits of participating in 
the monetary union.  
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Data Appendix 
Our main data source is the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts database (January 2004 
edition). Hence, data for sectoral components (i.e. industrial production and services) used in 
our paper are value added based. The table below lists the starting year of available data. Data 
from sources other than the OECD’s database are underlined. 
Starting year of available data 
Country name  Country 
code 
GDP Private 
consump
tion 
Investm
ent 
Exports Imports Indust. 
prod. 
Services 
CEECs           
Czech Republic  CZE  1993 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 
Estonia EST  1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1994 n.a. 
Hungary HUN  1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1995 1995 
Latvia LAT  1993 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 n.a. 
Lithuania LIT  1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 n.a.  n.a. 
Poland POL  1993 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 
Slovak Republic  SKK  1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1994 1994 
Slovenia SLO  1993 1999 1999 1999 1999 1993 1993 
EMU           
EMU-aggregate EMU  !  !  !  !  ! 1991 1991 
Austria AUT  !  1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 
Belgium BEL  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
France FRA  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
Finland FIN  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
Germany GER !  1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 
Ireland  IRE  1997 1997 1997 1997 1997  ! n.a. 
Italy ITA  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
Netherlands NDL  !  !  !  !  ! 1987  1987 
Portugal POR  !  1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 
Spain SPA  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
Control group           
Denmark  DEN  1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 
Sweden SWE  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
United Kingdom  UK  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
Switzerland SWI  !  !  !  !  !  ! n.a. 
Norway NOR  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
United States   USA  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
Japan JAP  !  !  !  !  !  ! n.a. 
Russia RUS  1993 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 
Notes: ! : the series is available since 1980; n.a.: not available. Series underlined are taken (at least 
partly) from other sources than the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts database. 26 ⏐ DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
Other sources: 
Czech Republic: quarterly national accounts are available from the OECD database since 
1994Q1. For 1993, GDP data was calculated with the method of Várpalotai (2003). 
EMU-aggregate: 4
th update (2003) of the ECB Area-Wide Model database for GDP and its 
expenditure components; see Fagan et al (2001). Value added of services and industrial 
production is from the ECB. 
Estonia: The IMF - International Financial Statistics (IFS) database contains real GDP and 
nominal expenditure components. Consumption was deflated with CPI; investments, exports 
and imports were deflated with PPI. For industrial output only gross industrial output is 
available (source: Eesti Pank). 
Greece: The only Greek data available at a quarterly frequency is gross industrial production, 
which is from the IFS. 
Hungary: quarterly national accounts are available from the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office since 1995Q1. For 1993-94, data were calculated by Várpalotai (2003). 
Ireland: Gross industrial production is from the IFS.  
Japan: Gross industrial production is from the IFS. 
Latvia: The source of GDP and its expenditure components for 1995Q1-2003Q3 is the 
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSBL). GDP for 1993-1994 is taken from the IFS, which 
was chained back to CSBL data starting in 1995. For industrial output only gross industrial 
output is available (source: CSBL). 
Lithuania: The IFS database contains real GDP and nominal expenditure components. 
Consumption was deflated with CPI; investments, exports and imports were deflated with 
PPI. The January 2004 issue of the IFS likely included measurement errors for real GDP as it 
indicated an annual real growth rate of around 40 percent in 1994. Therefore, we chained the 
data for 1993-94 as it was included in the November 2003 edition with data for 1995-2003 
included in the January 2004 edition.  
Poland: quarterly national accounts are available from 1995Q1 to 2002Q2 in the OECD 
dataset. Data for 2002Q3-Q4 (and some quarters in 2003) are from the dX Econdata of 
Emerging Market Economic Data Ltd. Quarterly GDP data for 1993-94 were calculated with 
the method of Várpalotai (2003). 
Portugal: quarterly national accounts are available in the OECD database since 1995. Pre-
1995 GDP data are from the IFS. 
Russia: dX Econdata of Emerging Market Economic Data Ltd (January 2004 edition) for 
1995-2003. GDP data for 1993-94 were calculated with the method of Várpalotai (2003). 
Slovak Republic: dX Econdata of Emerging Market Economic Data Ltd (January 2004 
edition). 
Slovenia: Bank of Slovenia. 
Switzerland: Gross industrial production is from the IFS. 
United States: Services - US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Gross 
industrial production is from the IFS.  
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Tables 
Table 1a. GDP – Leads or Lags of the Largest Correlation with the EMU 
Aggregate, 1983-2002 
  based on HP-filter    based on BP-filter 
 1983-
87 
1988-
92 
1993-
97 
1998-
2002 
 1983-
87 
1988-
92 
1993-
97 
1998-
2002 
CEECs 
CZE     -1  -3 -2 -3
EST     -3  -1 -3 -1
HUN    2  0 3 0
LAT     3  -3 3 -1
LIT     -3  -3 -3 -3
POL     0  1 0 1
SKK     0  3 -1 -3
SLO     2  1 2 2
EMU member states 
AUT 0  -1  0  0 0 0 0 1
BEL  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
FIN  3 3 2 0 3 3 2 0
FRA  0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0
GER  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IRE      0 1
ITA  0 3 0  -1 0 0 0 -1
NDL  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
POR   -1  0  0 0 0 -3
SPA  1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0
Control group 
DEN   2 1 0 2 1 0
SWE 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 1
SWI -2 1 0 0 -1 1 1 0
UK_  2 3 2 0 2 3 2 -1
NOR -2 0 2 0 -2 -1 1 0
JAP -1  1  -2  -1 0 1 -3 -1
USA -1 3 2 2 -1 3 3 2
RUS     -3  -1 -3 0
Notes: 0: contemporaneous correlation is the largest; negative value: the EMU leads the country 
studied; positive value: the EMU lags the country studied. The maximum leads/lags studied is 
3 quarters. 28 ⏐ DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
Table 1b. GDP – Leads or Lags of the Largest Correlation with the EMU-5 
Common Factor, 1983-2002 
  based on HP-filter    based on BP-filter 
 1983-
87 
1988-
92 
1993-
97 
1998-
2002 
 1983-
87 
1988-
92 
1993-
97 
1998-
2002 
CEECs 
CZE     -2  -3 -2 -3
EST     3  -1 -3 -1
HUN    1  -1 1 -1
LAT     2  -2 2 -1
LIT     3  3 -3 3
POL     -3  0 -1 0
SKK     0  3 0 3
SLO     2  0 2 0
EMU member states 
AUT 0  -1  0  0 0 0 0 0
BEL -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FIN  3 3 0 0 3 3 0 -1
FRA 0  0  -1  -1 0 3 0 -1
GER  0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1
IRE      0 0
ITA  0 0 0  -1 0 0 0 -2
NDL -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0
POR   -1  0  0 0 0 -3
SPA  1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Control group 
DEN   0 0 0 -2 0 0
SWE 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 -1
SWI -2 0 0  -1 -2 3 1 -1
UK_  0 3 0  -1 2 3 2 -2
NOR -2 0 1 0 -2 -1 1 -1
JAP -1  0  -3  -2 0 1 -3 -2
USA -2 3 0 0 -1 3 3 0
RUS     -3  -1 -3 0
Notes: 0: contemporaneous correlation is the largest; negative value: the EMU leads the country 
studied; positive value: the EMU lags the country studied. The maximum leads/lags studied is 
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Table 2. GDP – Volatility of the Cycle Relative to the Euro Area, 1983-2002 
  based on HP-filter    based on BP-filter 
 1983-
87 
1988-
92 
1993-
97 
1998-
02 
 1983-
87 
1988-
92 
1993-
97 
1998-
02 
CEECs (EMU = 100) 
CZE   251  189 297 275 
EST   367  261 413 399 
HUN   216  90 253 122 
LAT   305  180 356 263 
LIT   636  354 699 615 
POL   160  165 170 181 
SKK   100  146 79 168 
SLO   90  118 109 157 
EMU member states (EMU = 100) 
AUT  140 101 95 111 147 114 91 131 
BEL  127 104 128 151 123 109 138 181 
FIN  178 340 277 182 242 416 220 159 
FRA  122 105 114 114 88 90 122 102 
GER  149 154 90 105 174 229 111 132 
IRE     266 339 
ITA  101 94 134 91 90 105 146 126 
NDL  169 108 108 153 206 174 71 130 
POR   166 149 168 248 106 137 
SPA  163 143 139 101 104 128 106 60 
Control group (EMU = 100) 
DEN   131 168  73 162 168 103 
SWE  128 197 242 155 160 168 253 168 
SWI  148 187 93 109 196 177 62 114 
UK_ 101  251 109  69 136 191 129 105 
NOR  217 155 201 133 190 232 165 188 
JAP  144 180 184 139 149 163 210 202 
USA  169 152 75 145 204 130 112 162 
RUS   414  457 420 464 
Volatility of the euro area (in percent) 
 0.69 1.09 0.83 0.80 0.71 0.63 0.73 0.59 
Notes: Volatility is defined as the standard deviation around the mean zero.  30 ⏐ DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
Table 3. GDP – Dispersion of Correlation Coefficients, 1983-2002 
filter EMU-
measure 
1983-87 1988-92 1993-97 1998-02
Group 1 
HP AG  0.15  0.18 0.17 0.03
HP CF  0.19  0.10 0.11 0.08
BP AG  0.09  0.26 0.18 0.07
BP CF  0.11  0.26 0.11 0.15
Group 2 
HP AG  0.26  0.28 0.18 0.14
HP CF  0.14  0.17 0.13 0.12
BP AG  0.22  0.31 0.12 0.18
BP CF  0.18  0.28 0.11 0.14
Group 3 
HP AG  0.22  0.35 0.19 0.12
HP CF  0.09  0.25 0.10 0.07
BP AG  0.24  0.31 0.20 0.14
BP CF  0.19  0.33 0.12 0.21
Notes: The table shows mean absolute deviation from group-specific mean. Group 1: Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands; Group 2: Belgium, Finland, Portugal, Spain; Group 3: Denmark, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK; AG: based on aggregate data for the euro area; CF: based on the 
common factor of the 5 countries included in group 1. 
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Table 4. Private Consumption - Volatility of the Cycle Relative to the Euro 
Area, 1983-2002 
  based on HP-filter    based on BP-filter 
 1983-
87 
1988-
92 
1993-
97 
1998-
02 
 1983-
87 
1988-
92 
1993-
97 
1998-
02 
CEECs (EMU = 100) 
CZE   384  172 501 246 
EST   393  398 554 602 
HUN   350  143 392 206 
LAT   435  221 627 277 
LIT  1202  241 1826 353 
POL   221  135 264 163 
SKK   280  277 385 387 
SLO     174 274 
EMU member states (EMU = 100) 
AUT   84 102 88 106 145 116 
BEL 106  94 93  112 161 100 103 132 
FIN  155 317 330 136 393 311 333 117 
FRA  120 85 121 82 154 60 159 69 
GER   87  146 126 191 
IRE     508 737 
ITA  121 153 179 117 147 193 165 128 
NDL  120 121 137 154 220 221 111 117 
POR   141  171 197 184 
SPA  183 165 159 104 120 117 125 77 
Control group (EMU = 100) 
DEN   111 177 167 105 223 198 
SWE  266 194 185 173 301 180 196 196 
SWI  55 88 79 67 64 73 87 58 
UK_ 162  310 81  77 268 266 156 105 
NOR 400  145 136 95 615 244 138 149 
JAP 82  125 128  68 143 148 192 79 
USA 93  134 65  99 172 117 152 118 
RUS   391  482 578 550 
Volatility of the euro area (in percent) 
 0.69 1.09 0.83 0.80 0.71 0.63 0.73 0.59 
Notes: Volatility is defined as the standard deviation around the mean zero.  32 ⏐ DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
Table 5. Summary Table of Correlation, 1993-2002 
1993-1997          1998-2002   
EMU1 EMU2 OUTS USA JAP RUS CEE1 CEE2 CEE3
AG-HP 0.72 0.54 0.71 0.27 0.04 -0.60 0.19 0.43 -0.29
AG-BP 0.82 0.74 0.78 -0.17 0.08 -0.47 0.17 0.39 -0.33
CF-HP 0.61 0.38 0.60 0.52 -0.31 -0.54 0.26 0.05 -0.06
CF-BP 0.75 0.55 0.73 0.22 -0.27 -0.63 0.24 0.11 -0.25
AG-HP 0.85 0.34 0.81 0.73 0.50 0.72 0.42 -0.14 0.25
AG-BP 0.86 0.28 0.71 0.08 0.45 0.76 0.24 -0.18 -0.06
AG-HP 0.77 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.36 0.14 -0.21 0.38 -0.07
AG-BP 0.79 0.31 0.51 0.64 0.22 0.23 -0.19 0.34 -0.18
AG-HP 0.87 0.84 0.67 0.54 0.32 -0.43 -0.41 -0.17 -0.33
AG-BP 0.89 0.83 0.58 0.09 0.27 -0.49 -0.41 -0.23 -0.53
AG-HP 0.28 0.09 -0.22 0.34 0.04 0.07 0.25
AG-BP 0.42 0.50 0.44 0.07 -0.32 0.02 0.18
AG-HP 0.36 0.35 0.05 0.06 0.07 -0.03 -0.25 -0.23 -0.33
AG-BP 0.58 0.66 0.41 0.05 0.19 -0.32 -0.35 -0.35 -0.52
AG-HP 0.52 0.46 0.60 0.16 0.25 0.16 -0.19 -0.01 -0.16
AG-BP 0.57 0.42 0.63 -0.17 0.11 0.44 -0.29 -0.13 -0.17
EMU1: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands; EMU2: Finland,
Portugal, Spain, OUTS: Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland (not in services), UK; CEE1: 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia (only in GDP, industry, and services); CEE2: Czech Republic,
Slovakia; CEE3: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (not in industry)
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AG: using aggregate euro area data; CF: using the common factor; HP: Hordick-Prescott
filter; BP: Band-Pass filter
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EMU1 EMU2 OUTS USA JAP RUS CEE1 CEE2 CEE3
AG-HP 0.91 0.71 0.82 0.73 0.54 0.39 0.73 -0.34 -0.33
AG-BP 0.88 0.51 0.65 0.68 0.73 0.53 0.71 -0.16 -0.26
CF-HP 0.82 0.71 0.76 0.81 0.31 0.24 0.71 -0.31 -0.33
CF-BP 0.78 0.52 0.46 0.77 0.49 0.36 0.71 -0.25 -0.20
AG-HP 0.85 0.69 0.64 0.67 0.62 0.16 0.76 0.16 0.26
AG-BP 0.82 0.59 0.48 0.44 0.66 0.26 0.67 0.29 0.54
AG-HP 0.92 0.78 0.80 0.86 0.59 -0.03 0.79 0.64 0.28
AG-BP 0.90 0.73 0.73 0.84 0.67 0.00 0.80 0.63 0.37
AG-HP 0.91 0.77 0.91 0.89 0.47 -0.16 0.50 0.23 -0.09
AG-BP 0.85 0.61 0.81 0.84 0.56 0.13 0.48 0.34 -0.03
AG-HP 0.86 0.78 0.63 0.65 0.16 0.24 -0.67
AG-BP 0.79 0.58 0.48 0.59 0.48 0.19 -0.65
AG-HP 0.82 0.65 0.47 0.74 -0.47 -0.68 -0.12 -0.54 -0.24
AG-BP 0.73 0.41 0.21 0.57 -0.09 -0.62 0.03 -0.47 -0.22
AG-HP 0.85 0.64 0.60 0.91 0.63 0.07 0.24 -0.40 -0.47
AG-BP 0.75 0.23 0.30 0.93 0.64 0.33 0.22 -0.35 -0.55
EMU1: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands; EMU2: Finland, Ireland
(not in industry and services), Portugal, Spain, OUTS: Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland
(not in services), UK; CEE1: Hungary, Poland, Slovenia; CEE2: Czech Republic,
Slovakia; CEE3: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (not in industry)
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AG: using aggregate euro area data; CF: using the common factor; HP: Hordick-Prescott
filter; BP: Band-Pass filter
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.
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Table 6. Summary Table of the Absolute Value of Leads/Lags*, 1993-2002 
1993-1997          1998-2002   
EMU1 EMU2 OUTS USA JAP RUS CEE1 CEE2 CEE3
AG-HP 0.17 0.67 0.75 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.33 0.50 3.00
AG-BP 0.17 0.67 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.67 1.50 3.00
CF-HP 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.67
CF-BP 0.00 0.00 0.75 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.33 1.00 2.67
AG-HP 0.17 1.33 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.50
AG-BP 0.17 1.67 0.75 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.50
AG-HP 0.17 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 3.00 2.50 1.50 2.33
AG-BP 0.17 1.67 0.50 0.00 0.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00
AG-HP 0.00 0.00 0.75 2.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
AG-BP 0.00 1.00 1.25 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
AG-HP 1.50 2.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.33 2.50
AG-BP 1.33 1.67 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.67 2.50
AG-HP 1.00 0.33 2.50 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.67
AG-BP 0.83 0.00 1.75 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
AG-HP 0.33 0.33 0.75 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.50 2.50 3.00
AG-BP 0.67 1.33 1.25 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.50 2.50 3.00
EMU1: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands; EMU2: Finland, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, OUTS: Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland (not in services), UK; CEE1: 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia; CEE2: Czech Republic, Slovakia; CEE3: Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania (not in industry)
S
e
r
v
.
C
o
n
s
.
I
n
v
.
AG: using aggregate euro area data; CF: using the common factor; HP: Hordick-Prescott
filter; BP: Band-Pass filter
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EMU1 EMU2 OUTS USA JAP RUS CEE1 CEE2 CEE3
AG-HP 0.33 0.25 0.25 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 3.00 2.33
AG-BP 0.50 1.00 0.50 2.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 1.67
CF-HP 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 2.00 1.00 0.33 3.00 2.00
CF-BP 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.33 3.00 1.67
AG-HP 0.17 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.67 1.00 1.00
AG-BP 0.17 0.67 1.25 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.67 1.00 1.00
AG-HP 0.00 0.25 0.75 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.00 1.00 1.33
AG-BP 0.00 0.25 0.50 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.00 0.50 1.33
AG-HP 0.17 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.33 1.50 1.67
AG-BP 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
AG-HP 0.50 0.67 1.33 2.00 3.00 2.33 3.00
AG-BP 0.67 1.00 1.33 2.00 1.00 2.33 3.00
AG-HP 0.83 1.75 0.75 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.67 3.00 3.00
AG-BP 0.67 1.00 2.50 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00
AG-HP 0.17 0.75 0.75 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.67 3.00 2.67
AG-BP 0.50 2.50 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.67 3.00 2.67
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EMU1: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands; EMU2: Finland, Ireland ,
Ireland (not in industry and services), Portugal, Spain, OUTS: Denmark, Sweden,
Switzerland (not in services), UK; CEE1: Hungary, Poland, Slovenia; CEE2: Czech
Republic, Slovakia; CEE3: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (not in industry)
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AG: using aggregate euro area data; CF: using the common factor; HP: Hordick-Prescott
filter; BP: Band-Pass filter
 
* The table shows the group-specific mean of the absolute value of the leads/lags, since the mean of raw data could cancel out positive and negative values. 
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Table 7. Summary Table of Relative Volatility*, 1993-2002 
1993-1997          1998-2002   
EMU1 EMU2 OUTS USA JAP RUS CEE1 CEE2 CEE3
HP 111 188 147 72 176 397 155 175 436
BP 113 144 153 112 210 420 177 188 489
HP 121 120 151 57 181 132 128 301 232
BP 118 110 151 66 171 133 131 288 267
HP 120 118 109 126 146 137 379 191 406
BP 123 139 107 78 178 133 400 217 453
HP 100 130 93 54 201 358 244 189 306
BP 109 140 100 106 239 454 261 219 386
HP 211 436 270 106 461 204 1067
BP 275 604 522 171 907 326 1900
HP 120 210 134 66 131 401 285 332 676
BP 135 218 166 152 192 578 328 443 1002
HP 116 221 181 47 144 454 279 331 352
BP 126 222 207 117 161 638 356 394 451
EMU1: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands; EMU2: Finland,
Portugal, Spain, OUTS: Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland (not in services), UK; CEE1: 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia (only in GDP, industry, and services); CEE2: Czech Republic,
Slovakia; CEE3: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (not in industry)
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HP: Hordick-Prescott filter; BP: Band-Pass filter
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EMU1 EMU2 OUTS USA JAP RUS CEE1 CEE2 CEE3
HP 121 179 102 145 139 457 124 168 265
BP 134 174 123 162 202 464 153 222 426
HP 129 152 204 219 300 413 201 303 394
BP 138 150 229 188 370 471 233 387 454
HP 103 128 119 138 148 131 202 128 276
BP 106 132 124 147 176 144 219 153 328
HP 95 134 102 132 116 480 141 142 250
BP 104 149 103 160 181 596 164 194 337
HP 133 154 125 64 359 99 386
BP 147 138 142 82 406 126 501
HP 117 230 121 99 68 482 151 224 286
BP 126 279 139 118 79 550 214 317 411
HP 109 178 120 140 97 336 226 248 464
BP 126 198 128 167 158 484 325 383 704
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EMU1: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands; EMU2: Finland, Ireland
(not in industry and services), Portugal, Spain, OUTS: Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland
(not in services), UK; CEE1: Hungary, Poland, Slovenia; CEE2: Czech Republic,
Slovakia; CEE3: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (not in industry)
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HP: Hordick-Prescott filter; BP: Band-Pass filter
 
* EMU = 100 
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Table 8. Summary Table of Persistence, 1993-2002 
1993-1997          1998-2002   
EMU1 EMU2 OUTS USA JAP RUS CEE1 CEE2 CEE3
HP 0.56 0.60 0.77 0.65 0.87 0.88 0.26 0.84 0.49
BP 0.65 0.69 0.79 0.88 0.89 0.84 0.29 0.83 0.49
HP 0.80 0.76 0.69 0.82 0.91 0.59 0.60 0.54 0.48
BP 0.82 0.72 0.73 0.90 0.91 0.52 0.58 0.51 0.64
HP 0.64 0.31 0.70 0.84 0.82 0.50 0.06 0.41 0.79
BP 0.67 0.37 0.64 0.60 0.86 0.41 0.04 0.46 0.81
HP 0.63 0.63 0.69 0.79 0.96 0.54 0.53 0.42 0.68
BP 0.68 0.61 0.61 0.92 0.96 0.41 0.45 0.27 0.72
HP 0.65 0.76 0.70 0.42 -0.07 0.19 -0.08
BP 0.55 0.78 0.73 0.64 0.05 0.06 -0.04
HP 0.43 0.63 0.59 0.78 0.32 0.64 0.65 0.61 0.23
BP 0.51 0.66 0.65 0.93 0.41 0.68 0.55 0.60 0.36
HP 0.33 0.75 0.68 0.48 0.87 0.01 0.45 0.80 0.28
BP 0.35 0.74 0.68 0.90 0.85 0.12 0.43 0.76 0.32
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EMU1: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands; EMU2: Finland,
Portugal, Spain, OUTS: Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland (not in services), UK; CEE1: 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia (only in GDP, industry, and services); CEE2: Czech Republic,
Slovakia; CEE3: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (not in industry). 
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HP: Hordick-Prescott filter; BP: Band-Pass filter
  
EMU1 EMU2 OUTS USA JAP RUS CEE1 CEE2 CEE3
HP 0.83 0.63 0.65 0.88 0.72 0.81 0.59 0.80 0.71
BP 0.78 0.34 0.67 0.83 0.74 0.69 0.56 0.78 0.79
HP 0.70 0.65 0.57 0.94 0.80 0.73 0.73 0.30 0.77
BP 0.69 0.52 0.61 0.89 0.81 0.72 0.73 0.36 0.78
HP 0.79 0.61 0.72 0.85 0.75 0.34 0.53 0.57 0.80
BP 0.76 0.53 0.70 0.82 0.77 0.32 0.50 0.61 0.81
HP 0.80 0.71 0.79 0.90 0.80 0.78 0.24 0.69 0.74
BP 0.75 0.61 0.70 0.88 0.84 0.77 0.30 0.72 0.75
HP 0.81 0.85 0.62 0.78 0.76 0.34 0.46
BP 0.77 0.67 0.62 0.78 0.71 0.28 0.44
HP 0.84 0.53 0.73 0.86 0.56 0.80 0.34 0.76 0.28
BP 0.77 0.25 0.67 0.83 0.40 0.75 0.42 0.77 0.33
HP 0.69 0.63 0.78 0.95 0.80 0.64 0.05 0.72 0.56
BP 0.52 0.41 0.64 0.92 0.80 0.62 0.11 0.76 0.56
EMU1: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands; EMU2: Finland,
Portugal, Spain, OUTS: Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland (not in services), UK; CEE1: 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia; CEE2: Czech Republic, Slovakia; CEE3: Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania (not in industry).
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HP: Hordick-Prescott filter; BP: Band-Pass filter
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Figures 
Figure 1a. GDP Cycles of CEECs and Russia, 1980-2002 
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Figure 1b. GDP Cycles of EMU Members, 1980-2002 
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Figure 1c. GDP Cycles of Control Group Countries, 1980-2002 
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Figure 2a. GDP - Correlation with the Cycle of EMU Aggregate, 1983-2002 
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Figure 2b. GDP - Correlation with the Cycle of EMU-5 Common Factor, 1983-
2002 
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Figure 3. GDP – Correlation of CEECs with the Cycles of Russia and the EMU, 
1993-2002 
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Notes: Empty symbols indicate values for 1993-97, while filled symbols for 1998-2002. The three Baltic 
states are denoted with triangles, the Czech Republic and Slovakia with squares, and Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia with circles.  42 | DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
Figure 4. GDP – Level of Correlation with the EMU Cycle, 1998-2002 
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Figure 5. GDP – Persistence, 1983-2002 
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Figure 6. GDP – Relative Impact of the EMU-5 Common Factor*, 1993-2002 
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Figure 7. The Share of EMU in Exports, 1993-2001 
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Figure 8. Industrial Production – Correlation with the Cycle of the EMU 
Aggregate, 1983-2002 
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Figure 9. Industrial Production – Level of Correlation with the Cycle of EMU 
Aggregate, 1998-2002 
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Figure 10. Exports – Correlation with the Cycle of the EMU Aggregate, 
1983-2002 
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Figure 11. Imports – Correlation with the Cycle of the EMU Aggregate, 
1983-2002 
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Figure 12. Private Consumption – Correlation with the Cycle of the EMU 
Aggregate, 1983-2002 
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Figure 13. The Consumption Correlation Puzzle: Correlation of Consumption 
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Note: no data is available for Ireland and Slovenia in 1993-97. 
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Note: no data are available for Ireland and Slovenia in 1993-97. 
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Figure 14. Private Consumption – Persistence, 1983-2002 
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Figure 15a. EMU members: International Investment Position, 1980-2002 
(percent of GDP) 
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Notes: All panels are equally scaled to [0,100] except that of Finland and Ireland. Liabilities are the stock of 
foreign investment in the domestic economy; assets are the stock of domestic investment abroad. 
FDI: foreign direct investment, PI: portfolio investment. Source: authors' calculation based on data 
in the IMF-International Financial Statistics. 
 BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONISATION IN THE ENLARGED EU ⏐ 53 
 
Figure 15b. Control group: International Investment Position, 1980-2002 
(percent of GDP) 
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Notes: All panels are equally scaled to [0,70] except that of Switzerland. For wider international comparison, 
the Figure also includes data for Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), Mexico (MEX), and South Africa 
(SAF). Liabilities are the stock of foreign investment in the domestic economy; assets are the stock 
of domestic investment abroad. FDI: foreign direct investment, PI: portfolio investment. Source: 
authors' calculation based on data in the IMF-International Financial Statistics. 54 | DARVAS & SZAPÀRY 
 
Figure 15c. CEECs: International Investment Position, 1980-2002 
(percent of GDP) 
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Notes: All panels are equally scaled to [0,60]. For wider international comparison, the Figure also includes 
data for Bulgaria (BUL), Romania (ROM), and Croatia (CRO). Liabilities are the stock of foreign 
investment in the domestic economy; assets are the stock of domestic investment abroad. FDI: 
foreign direct investment, PI: portfolio investment. Source: authors' calculation based on data in the 
IMF-International Financial Statistics. 
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Figure 16. Investment – Correlation with the Cycle of the EMU Aggregate, 
1983-2002 
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